BURNSIDE AGAINST PROMONTORIA (CHESTNUT) LIMITED [2017] ScotCS CSOH

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Pursuer: M S H Lindsay QC, Massaro; DAC Beachcroft Scotland LLP (for Dallas McMillan, Glasgow)

[1] The pursuer is a property investor and developer. He is the owner of 26 properties

located in the Borders area of Scotland. Clydesdale Bank Plc (“Clydesdale”) provided the

pursuer with loan funding to enable him to purchase and develop those properties. The

properties were rented out to tenants. In 2012, the pursuer became obliged to repay the

loans. In August 2012, the amount due by the pursuer to Clydesdale in respect of the loans

[2] The pursuer and Clydesdale entered into an agreement, dated 24 and 31 August 2012

(“the Agreement”). Put broadly, in terms of the Agreement, Clydesdale was to arrange for

the properties to be sold, with agents being jointly instructed, and the pursuer was to fully

co-operate in that regard. Clydesdale was then to retain the proceeds of sale in permanent

reduction of the debt owed by the pursuer. After the sale, the debt was to be held as

extinguished. Until the properties were sold, the pursuer was obliged to manage them and

to remit the rental income to Clydesdale, subject to deduction of maintenance costs.

[3] In terms of an assignation in June 2015, Clydesdale assigned its rights in respect of

the Agreement to the defender. Clydesdale also assigned to the defender the benefit of the

standard securities held over the majority, if not all, of the properties.

[4] The properties have not been sold. By letter dated 10 March 2016, the defender

purported to terminate the Agreement, on the basis that the pursuer had failed to account

[5] In its Summons in this action, the pursuer seeks declarators to the effect that the

Agreement has not been validly terminated by the defender and remains in force, that the

debt referred to in the Agreement includes all sums (including interest) due to Clydesdale

and to the defender, and that after the sale of the properties that debt will be extinguished.

The pursuer also seeks specific implement of the defender’s obligation in respect of

[6] The pursuer founds upon the existence of an implied term in the Agreement,

expressed in the pleadings as follows: “that the Properties would be marketed and then sold

within a reasonable time”. The pursuer contends that the failures by Clydesdale, and,

following the assignation, by the defender, to comply with this implied term constitute a

material breach of contract, entitling the pursuer to withhold performance of his obligations

under the Agreement. The pursuer further contends that the purported termination of the

Agreement by the defender had no effect, as it proceeded upon the basis of non-

performance by the pursuer of obligations in respect of which he was entitled to withhold

performance, because of the defender’s breach of the implied term.

[7] The defender’s position in its Defences is that no such term falls to be implied into

the Agreement and that the Agreement was validly terminated as a result of the pursuer

being in material breach of contract by failing to account for the rental income received.

[8] In a Counterclaim, the defender seeks recovery of the outstanding debt, on the basis

that the defender has validly terminated the Agreement. In its Answers to the

Counterclaim, the pursuer denies that the Agreement has been validly terminated and avers

that it remains in full force and effect. Esto it had been validly terminated, the pursuer’s

position is that the sums sued for in the Counterclaim are excessive and that the defender is

[9] The case called before me for debate in respect of the principal action. The defender

sought dismissal of the principal action, which failing the exclusion of certain averments

from probation, by the sustaining of the first and/or second pleas in law for the defender.

The central issue at debate was whether the Agreement contained the implied term founded

[10] In the Agreement, the pursuer is referred to as “the Debtor” and Clydesdale as “the

Bank”. The terms of the Agreement which are of relevance for present purposes are as

2.1.3 to maintain and repair each of the Properties so that the same are at all times

2.1.5 that all rental income received in respect of the Properties will continue to be

paid directly to the Bank in reduction of his debt to the Bank until transfer of title of

2.1.6 to observe and perform all covenants, requirements and obligations from

time to time imposed on, applicable to or otherwise, affecting the Properties and/or

the use, ownership, occupation, possession, operation, repair, maintenance or other

enjoyment or exploitation of the Properties whether imposed by statute, law or

regulation, contract, grant or otherwise, carry out all registrations or renewals and

generally do all other acts and things (including the taking of legal proceedings)

necessary or desirable to maintain, defend or preserve his right, title and interest to

and in the Properties without infringement by any third party;…

2.2 At the sole discretion of the Bank, the Bank shall permit the release of the

Rental Maintenance Costs to the Debtor from the rental income sums received in

accordance with Clause 2.1.5 of this Agreement. Such release is conditional upon the

Debtor providing the Bank with a schedule evidencing the Rental Maintenance Costs

required and invoices as evidence of the level of the Rental Maintenance Costs

required to be paid. The Bank shall, within 5 business days of receipt of such

schedule and invoices, advise the Debtor whether the Bank will permit the release of

the Rental Maintenance Costs. The Debtor will require written consent from the Bank

before incurring any costs, other than the Rental Maintenance Costs, such consent

2.3 The Debtor acknowledges that agents jointly instructed in the interests of

both parties will market the sale of the Properties as a portfolio sale and/or

individually and/or in parts as agreed by the parties both acting reasonably. The

agents will then recommend to the parties the preferred disposal strategy for the

Properties. The parties will irrevocably consent to proceed with the disposal strategy

The Bank, and the Bank’s agents, shall arrange and facilitate the sale of the

Properties. The Proceeds received from the sale of the Properties shall belong to the

Bank in permanent reduction of the Debt. Once all the Properties have sold and the

Proceeds received by the Bank, the Bank acknowledges that the Debt shall be held as

In the event that the Debtor does not, to the complete satisfaction of the Bank,

comply with its undertakings in Clause 2.1, the Bank shall be entitled to pursue the

Debtor in respect of the whole amount of the balance of the Debt due to the Bank

together with all accrued interest, charges and any other amounts due by the Debtor

and take all and any action to enforce to the fullest extent permitted by law, its rights

This Agreement forms the entire agreement between the parties relating to the

subject matter of this Agreement. It is agreed that any future variation hereof may

only take the form of a formal variation of this Agreement, referring in terms to this

Agreement. In particular it is agreed that this Agreement supersedes all earlier

meetings, discussions, correspondence, facsimile transmissions, letters and

communications, understandings and arrangements of any kind in relation to its

subject matter and that there are no collateral or supplemental agreements in relation

to its subject matter at the time of conclusion of this Agreement.

The parties to this Agreement undertake to do all acts and things and deliver all

documents necessary to expedite or desirable to give effect to the provisions of this

Agreement and the spirit, meaning and intent of the arrangements contemplated

[11] In summary, the submissions on behalf of the defender were as follows. The

pursuer’s case was founded upon the pursuer being able to retain rental payments received

by him in respect of the properties, notwithstanding clause 2.1.5 of the Agreement, which

[12] The suggested implied term which the pursuer relied upon did not fall to be implied.

Reference was made to the case of Exxonmobil Sales and Supply Corporation v Texaco Limited

[2003] EWHC 1964 (Comm), in which it was held that the entire agreement clause was

sufficient to exclude implied terms based upon usage or custom. The entire agreement

clause in clause 8 of the Agreement in the present case excluded the possibility of implying

[13] The implication of this term would very significantly change the nature of the

Agreement. Such a term should not be considered to be intrinsic to the Agreement.

[14] The basis for the implied term was not stated on averment but it was understood that

it was said to be implied as a matter of law. It was accepted that the court will often imply a

reasonable period for the performance of an obligation, in quite a variety of contracts.

However, in the present case the entire agreement clause in clause 8 of the Agreement

excluded the implied term argument given that the implication of the term would change

the nature of the agreement. In that regard, reliance was placed on Marks and Spencer Plc v

BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2016] AC 742, and its reference to the

five-point test expressed in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180

CLR 266. It was argued that none of the five criteria identified in the latter case was met in

[15] The Agreement was about reallocation of risk in the context of a compromise. The

pursuer had no substantial interest in the timescales for performance. The risk of any

shortfall under the Agreement fell upon the Bank and the defender, while the risk of the

Bank or the defender getting more from the sales than was due by the pursuer lay with the

[16] In relation to the pursuer’s argument that he remains subject to an onerous

obligation to maintain the property, any prejudice in that respect was met by the application

of clause 2.2 which permits maintenance costs to be deducted from the rent. The only

obligations on the pursuer were those in clause 2. There were no onerous obligations.

[17] Any delay by the defender in not disposing of the properties was not of any real

consequence to the pursuer. In cases in which a reasonable time for the performance of an

obligation was implied, it was for the benefit of the party who was seeking to imply the

term. That was not the position here. The sale of the properties would not give a benefit to

the pursuer. The purpose of the Agreement was to allow the defender to dispose of the

properties and recover so far as possible to the extent of the pursuer’s debt.

[18] Even if the court was prepared to imply the term, the pursuer’s averments remained

irrelevant for two reasons. Firstly, there were no averments of what a reasonable time

would have been. The pursuer could not lead evidence about an unspecified breach, still

less that this was material. The proposed implied term was therefore too nebulous.

Secondly, on the pursuer’s own averments the period during which he was entitled to

withhold the rent ended in July 2016 (see Article 12 of Condescendence). That was so

because it was clear from the letter produced by the defender, dated 14 July 2016, that the

defender was taking steps to market the property. It was also plain on the pursuer’s own

averments that on 14 July 2016 marketing steps were under way. The continued retention of

rental sums for two months by the pursuer occurred despite the pursuer being aware that

the property would now be marketed. It was acknowledged that the appointment of the

property agent at that time was not a joint one, but this made no real difference.

Accordingly there was a material breach by the pursuer and no breach by the defender.

[19] The pursuer in its Note of Argument refers to interest potentially accruing and being

due by him, and this therefore being one of the reasons why the term should be implied.

The defender does, in the Counterclaim, seek interest but on the basis that the Agreement

was validly terminated, not on the basis that the Agreement is continuing. Interest is

therefore not relevant to the question of implication of the proposed implied term. In its

Note of Argument the pursuer refers to the fact that no ultimatum was given to the pursuer.

However, the letter of 14 July 2016 was a sufficient ultimatum. The pursuer was

[20] The pursuer’s averments were therefore irrelevant and the action should be

[21] In summary, the submissions on behalf of the pursuer were as follows. The court

should refuse the defender’s motion for dismissal and allow a proof before answer on all

[22] In relation to the implied term, the pursuer’s averments were relevant. Terms of that

nature were consistently implied by the courts at common law into all contracts where there

was no express timescale for the performance of an obligation. The basis for the implied

term was the common law. What is a reasonable time was to be judged retrospectively. The

question of the period of a reasonable time depended on the particular facts and

circumstances and the relationship between the parties. The obligation in the implied term

was a counterpart to the pursuer’s obligation to remit rent to the defender and the principle

of mutuality therefore applied. The innocent party could refrain from performing his

obligations until the party in breach recommenced performance of his obligation. This

allowed the pursuer to retain the rent. The defender’s breach of the implied term was of

[23] There was no obligation to account for rent which had been lawfully withheld if

there was a period of time during which the defender was not performing its obligation. If a

person could be in breach and eventually get round to performing his obligation, there

would be no incentive to perform within a set timescale if re-engaging with the contractual

obligations resulted in the other party having then to perform all of his obligations,

including payment during the period when the defender was not performing. If the

defender had remedied its breach, going forward the rent would require to have been

remitted, but there was no obligation to pay the arrears up to that date.

[24] However, senior counsel also submitted, in clarification of the pursuer’s position,

that at no point had the sums received in rent been sufficient to pay for the pursuer’s costs in

maintaining the properties in terms of the Agreement. There was therefore no sum which

[25] There was nothing in the Agreement which would exclude the implication of the

term relied upon by the pursuer. The Agreement contained no express term that was

contradicted by the proposed implied term. There was similarly nothing which would

exclude the implied term by inference from any express terms. Reference was made to the

speeches of Lord Watson and Lord Ashbourne in Hick v Raymond & Reid [1893] AC 22. The

[26] The point that was made on behalf of the defender about the possibility of a collapse

of the market, so that the defender had to have the time to select when to market the

properties, was of no relevance, because the reasonableness of the time depends upon the

whole circumstances, including any such circumstance. If marketing had been delayed

because of matters beyond the defender’s control, such as a poor market, there would be no

breach of the obligation. A reasonable time period was a flexible concept and the court can

[27] The Agreement did not have any express timescale. The five points referred to in

BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings simply didn’t apply. The context in that

case was the implication of a term based upon business efficacy. In the present case the

basis was implication at common law. That distinction was explained by Lord Neuberger in

Marks and Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd (at para 15).

[28] The implied term argued for in the present case was not expressly excluded nor was

it excluded by necessary implication. Every obligation must be performed within a

reasonable time unless that was expressly or impliedly excluded. This was an agreement for

the sale of properties, that sale being fundamental. The marketing of properties for sale was

not a perpetual obligation - it was a fundamental purpose of entering into the Agreement.

[29] The pursuer did have an interest in the properties being marketed and sold within a

reasonable period of time. Clause 5 was the proverbial sword of Damocles hanging over the

pursuer. If he defaulted on his obligation under clause 2.1, accrued interest would be

payable. An inadvertent breach by the pursuer could give rise to say, £1,000,000 of

additional interest due by him. That was one reason why performance within a reasonable

time was important to him. Further, he was effectively acting as the unpaid managing agent

of the properties. This management of some 26 properties was a time-consuming and

onerous task for the pursuer to undertake. This was another reason why it was very much

in the pursuer’s interests for the properties to be marketed and sold within a reasonable

[30] There was nothing in the structure or underlying purpose of the Agreement that

would exclude the common law implied term to market the properties within a reasonable

time. On the contrary the pursuer had a strong interest in not being exposed to the

consequences of default in the form of additional interest and in not having to continue to

[31] Some of the express terms in the Agreement were in fact consistent with marketing

within a reasonable time. For example, clause 9 speaks of things that are necessary to

expedite the performance of the obligations. In Whuan Ocean Economic & Technical

Cooperation Company Ltd and others v Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft “Hansa Murcia” mbH and Co KG

[2012] EWHC 3104, it was said (at para 24) that the obligation in question in that case had a

temporal content, with the result that any time limit had to be implied. The court added that

where parties impose a unilateral obligation, without specifying the limit in which it is to be

done, there must be some implication of the time when it is to be done, because the parties

cannot have intended the obligation to be of perpetual or indefinite duration. The unilateral

obligation in that case was to extend the validity of a guarantee. Similarly in the present

case the parties cannot have intended the obligation to be perpetual or indefinite. There

must be some restriction implied by the common law: it was performance within a

[32] Turning to the question of whether the defender was in material breach of the

implied term such as to justify retention, the obligations were plainly the counterparts of one

another and the breach was of sufficient materiality. Reference was made to Hoult v Turpie

2004 SLT 308 (at paras 9 and 10), the presumption being that one obligation is the

counterpart of the other and that there should be no artificial attempt to break up the unity

of the contract. The obligation on the part of the pursuer to remit the rent was a counterpart

of the defender’s obligation to market and sell the property within a reasonable period of

[33] In relation to materiality, reference was made to Inveresk Plc v Tullis Russell

Papermakers Ltd [2010] UKSC 19; 2010 SC 106 (per Lord Hope at para 43) and to the

authorities quoted in McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd ed, at 20.60. The concept

of marketing properties encompassed the obligation to make the joint instruction for selling.

The proposed implied term was wide enough to cover the commencement of marketing by

making a joint instruction. The proposed implied term effectively mirrored the obligation

on the defender in clause 3. That obligation was wider than simply sale; it was to arrange

and facilitate the sale. This tied in with the joint instructions for marketing, as referred to in

clause 2.3, which set out what was to be done to arrange and facilitate the sale. In the

present case the defender had done nothing. Jointly instructing the agent should have

occurred very shortly after the contract was entered into. There was no reason why the

process of joint instruction could not have been started at some earlier point. There was no

need in the context of retention to meet the high threshold of materiality which the law

[34] The question of whether a reasonable time had been exceeded required a broad

consideration, with the benefit of hindsight (Peregrine Systems Ltd v Steria Ltd [2005] EWCA

[35] As to the alleged breaches, the pursuer adhered to the position referred to in Article 6

of Condescendence, that at no time was any balance of rent due to the defender, the repair

and maintenance costs having consumed the sums received in rent. There was therefore no

breach of any kind by the pursuer. Articles 12 and 13 of Condescendence explained why the

engagement of the company Cairn as agents did not remedy the defender’s breach. In any

event Cairn had done nothing. These were matters which required to go to proof. Taking

the pursuer’s averments pro veritate, they did not show the defender no longer to be in

[36] Turning next to the entire agreement clause, the authority relied upon by the

defender (Exxonmobil Sales and Supply Corporation v Texaco Limited) did not support the

proposition made that the entire agreement clause (in clause 8 of the Agreement) excluded

the implied term. The implied term was an intrinsic part of the Agreement. Clause 8

referred to collateral or supplementary agreements, which were things extrinsic to the

Agreement. In order to exclude the proposed implied term, the wording of any entire

agreement clause must make clear that the term cannot be implied on the basis sought, in

this case the common law. In Exxonmobil Sales and Supply Corporation v Texaco Limited the

express terms of the entire agreement clause prevented anything being implied of the kind

argued for, which was to do with usage. Here, the entire agreement clause had nothing in it

to prevent the term being implied by operation of the law. The authorities made clear that

an implied term of this kind was an intrinsic part of the Agreement and express provision

within the entire agreement clause is needed in order to exclude the implied term. In that

regard, reference was made to AXA Sun Life Services Plc v Campbell Martin Ltd and others

[2012] Bus L R 203 (per Stanley Brunton LJ at paras 13, 34, 35 and 36), to support the

proposition that the question of whether an entire agreement clause excluded the implied

term depended upon the precise wording of the clause. Reference was also made to Barden

v Commodities Research Unit International (Holdings) Ltd and others [2013] EWHC 1633 (Ch)

(per Vos J at paras 16 and 47) and to Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th ed, at 3.16,

[37] In the present case the reference in clause 8 to collateral or supplemental agreements

did not cover the implied term, which was not collateral or supplemental. It was intrinsic; it

was part of the agreement. Clause 8 of the Agreement was no answer to the pursuer’s case.

[38] In reply, counsel for the defender explained that he had taken the pursuer’s

pleadings to mean that the pursuer was indeed withholding payment of rent, from 2014. In

any event, there were no averments that the pursuer had satisfied the terms of clause 2.2 in

the Agreement which provided that the release of sums was at the sole discretion of the

defender, after the pursuer had undertaken the procedure laid down. Retention was not

available as of right. It was clear from Article 6 of Condescendence that the schedules

required in terms of clause 2.2 were no longer provided by the pursuer after 2014. The

[39] The cases of AXA Sun Life Services Plc v Campbell Martin Ltd and others and Barden v

Commodities Research Unit International (Holdings) Ltd and others did not assist the pursuer.

AXA was about collateral warranties and misrepresentations whereas the present case was

about the implication of a timescale which fundamentally changed the nature of the

agreement. Barden concerned the construction of a clause in a way that avoided absurdity,

not the implication of a clause which would change the nature of the agreement.

[40] The central issue raised in submissions is whether or not the implied term contended

for by the pursuer forms part of the Agreement. As can be seen from the summary I have

given of the submissions, the parties also raised related points. The defender argued that

there was no specification of the duration of a reasonable time and also that the implied

term changed the nature of the Agreement. Further, the defender argued that it had in fact,

in July 2016, taken steps to market the property, with the result that, even if there had been

breaches of the implied term prior to that date, they ceased at that point. The defender also

contended that even if the pursuer was correct that there were no sums to be remitted to the

defender because of the costs of maintenance, the pursuer was still in breach of clause 2.2 of

the Agreement. The pursuer argued that the defender’s breach of the implied term was of

sufficient materiality to justify retention and that the obligations were counterparts of one

another, so that any withholding of performance by the pursuer (had that occurred) was

justified. The pursuer further contended that the purported termination of the Agreement

based on the alleged breach by the pursuer was invalid, in light of the pursuer’s right to

[41] In my opinion, only the issues relating to the proposed implied term can be

determined at this stage. The other points raised (alleged breaches of contract by either

party and the effects of any such breach) cannot be determined on the pleadings alone. In

relation to its purported termination of the Agreement, the defender avers (in Answer 11)

that the specific breach of contract by the pursuer founded upon was the failure by the

pursuer to pay all rental income received by him, as required by clause 2.1.5 of the

Agreement. On the pursuer’s averments, there is a factual issue as to whether there were

any sums received in rent to be remitted to the defender, in light of the maintenance costs.

There are no specific averments by the defender about an alleged breach of clause 2.2. It is

therefore not surprising that the pursuer makes no averments of compliance with this

obligation. In any event, the question of whether the pursuer met the terms of clause 2.2

and, if not, the effect of any such breach (in particular, whether it would justify rescission by

the defender) must in my view be a matter for proof. Similarly, on the question of whether,

if the term contended for by the pursuer indeed fell to be implied, a breach of it by the

defender was of sufficient materiality to justify withholding of the pursuer’s obligations, it

will be necessary to hear evidence about the nature and circumstances of that breach in

order to assess its materiality or otherwise. The question of whether the events in July 2016

(the instruction of Cairn estate agents and what, if anything, followed) amounted to

performance of obligations under the implied term and the Agreement is also a matter for

Subject to the effect of the entire agreement clause (clause 8), does the implied term contended for

[42] In Hick v Raymond & Reid the decision of the court was that where a bill of lading is

silent as to the time within which the consignee is to discharge the ship’s cargo, his

obligation is to discharge it within a reasonable time. In his speech, Lord Watson stated (at

“Where the language of a contract does not expressly, or by necessary implication,

fix any time for the performance of a contractual obligation, the law implies that it

shall be performed within a reasonable time. The rule is of general application, and it

is not confined to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.”

This succinct statement explains the circumstances in which such a term falls to be implied,

and also makes clear that it is implied as a matter of law, the rule being of general

application. Lord Watson’s dictum has not, so far as I am aware, been the subject of criticism

[43] As was pointed out by Lord Neuberger in Marks and Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas

“… there are two types of contractual implied term. The first, with which this case is

concerned, is a term which is implied into a particular contract, in light of the express

terms, commercial common sense, and the facts known to both parties at the time the

contract was made. The second type of implied term arises because, unless such a

term is expressly excluded, the law (sometimes by statute, sometimes through the

common law) effectively imposes certain terms into certain classes of relationship.”

Similarly, in Geys v Société Générale London Branch [2012] UKSC 63; [2013] 1 All ER 1061 at

“In this connection, it is important to distinguish between two different kinds of

implied terms. First, there are those terms which are implied into a particular

contract because, on its proper construction, the parties must have intended to

include them: see Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10,

[2009] 2 All ER 1127, [2009] 1 WLR 1988. Such terms are only implied where it is necessary

to give business efficacy to the particular contract in question. Second, there are those

terms which are implied into a class of contractual relationship, such as that between

landlord and tenant or between employer and employee, where the parties may have

left a good deal unsaid, but the courts have implied the term as a necessary incident

of the relationship concerned, unless the parties have expressly excluded it: see Lister

v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555, [1957] 1 All ER 125, [1957] 2 WLR

158; Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, [1976] 2 All ER 39, 74 LGR 392.”

[44] While these comments about terms which are implied as a matter of law, rather than

implied by fact, refer to certain classes of relationship, as Lord Watson makes clear the

implied term of performance within a reasonable time is a term applied generally in

contracts (absent express contrary provision). In any event, the idea of classes of contractual

relationship for this purpose simply means a defined type of contract (one of a genus rather

than being sui generis: Ashmore v Corpn of Lloyd’s (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyds Rep 620). There are

plainly examples of contractual relationships which very regularly occur and where terms

are implied by law (such as employment, carriage, sale of goods) but there are others of a

particular class or type where the implication of the term will arise. The present case is one

in which one party has agreed to arrange for the sale of certain property, in payment of a

debt owed by the other party. That could in my view properly be regarded as a class or type

of relationship for the purposes of implication of a term requiring performance within a

reasonable time. However, the existence of such a class or type, is not, in terms of Lord

Watson’s dictum, a requirement for the implication of that particular implied term.

[45] Plainly, the law on the implication of terms has developed since the decision in Hick

v Raymond & Reid but those developments have not affected the principle enunciated and

applied by Lord Watson. The discussion in Marks and Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities

Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd about the implied term in that case, and its reference to the five

points stated in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings, is in the context of terms

[46] Where an obligation is to act within a reasonable period of time, that is an

implication of law and it is then a matter of construction as to what is the duration of the

reasonable time: see CSSA Chartering and Shipping Services SA v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd

[2017] EWHC 2579 (Comm), Popplewell J at para 21 J; Evera SA Commercial v North

Shipping Company Ltd (The North Anglia) [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep 367 (Devlin J at 375). I accept

that the question of whether a reasonable time has been exceeded is a matter for broad

consideration, to be viewed with the benefit of hindsight when the issue of alleged breach

arises for determination, in all of the relevant circumstances of the case (Peregrine Systems

Ltd v Steria Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 239, per Maurice Kay LJ at para 15).

[47] Lord Watson’s dictum does not, in terms, refer to the possibility of the implied term

being excluded, for example by an entire agreement clause, but it is plain from the

observations of the Supreme Court in Marks and Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services

Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd and Geys v Société Générale London Branch that exclusion by an express

[48] Applying the authorities, the first issue is to consider whether (to use Lord Watson’s

words) the language of the Agreement does not expressly, or by necessary implication, fix

any time for the performance of the obligation in question. This involves construction of the

terms of the Agreement, on the well-established principles, including consideration of the

natural and ordinary meaning of the language, having regard to the context and background

as known to both parties and, where appropriate, considerations of business common sense.

The Agreement does not contain any terms which indicate that it is perpetual or indefinite.

Equally there is nothing in the Agreement or in the context or background, or indeed based

upon business common sense, which could indicate that the parties had left it entirely in the

discretion of the defender as to when the defender wished to arrange for the sale of the

properties. There is nothing to indicate that the parties intended to allow that the defender

could take a period of time that was in all of the circumstances unreasonable for the

[49] In short, there is no provision which, expressly or by necessary implication, fixes a

time for the performance of the obligation, in clause 3 of the Agreement, to arrange for and

facilitate the sale of the properties. The suggested implied term therefore meets the

[50] There is no need, on the authorities, positively to identify features of the contract, or

its context or background, or business common sense, which point towards the existence of

such an implied term. But had it been necessary to do so, such features can plainly be

identified. As it was put on the pursuer’s behalf, he requires, in effect, to act as the manager

of 26 properties and to perform a wide range of tasks in respect of them, all as encompassed

within the terms of clauses 2.1.3 and 2.1.6 of the Agreement. He remains subject to those

obligations for as long as the properties are not sold. He also remains subject to his other

obligations, and there is some force in the pursuer’s contention that in the event of an

inadvertent breach of contract the pursuer could become exposed to a claim for additional

interest. On the pursuer’s averments, this could involve substantial sums. It is in his

interests to become free from that possible liability and it is also of course very much in his

interests to become free from the debt. From the defender’s perspective, the debt requires to

be paid off and it has accepted that the proceeds of the sale of the properties will suffice for

that purpose. Clause 9 of the Agreement involves a mutual undertaking to do everything

“necessary to expedite or desirable to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement”, which

suggests that there is some form of temporal dimension to performance of the obligations.

[51] It is important to recognise that what is a reasonable period of time will depend

upon all of the circumstances, as was made clear in Hick v Raymond & Reid. In an

appropriate case, a reasonable time can be a period of years (see eg McCall's Entertainments

(Ayr) Ltd v South Ayrshire Council (No 2) 1998 SLT 1421, at 1428 K-L). The factors noted in the

previous paragraph may be relevant to the determination of that issue, but that is a matter

for the court hearing the proof. If a party has averred reasons for having delayed in

performance, these will certainly be considered. From the point of view of the defender,

there may well be factors that point towards the duration of a reasonable period of time in

which to perform its obligations, one possibility being market conditions. However, at

[52] As I have noted above, the averment by the pursuer in relation to the implied term

contended for is in the following terms: “that the Properties would be marketed and then

sold within a reasonable time”. Clause 3 of the Agreement imposed on the defender the

obligation that it “…shall arrange and facilitate the sale of the Properties…”. Clause 2.3

refers to the properties being marketed for sale by agents jointly instructed by the parties,

who would recommend the disposal strategy, to which the parties would be required to

consent. On the face of it, it might be said that the proposed implied term introduces not

only a requirement to perform an obligation stated in the Agreement within a reasonable

time but an alteration to the language of the Agreement by requiring the defender to market

[53] However, in the Summons, the pursuer concludes for specific implement “in terms

of clause 3.1” of the Agreement (which must be reference to clause 3, there being no

clause 3.1) and refers to the appointment of jointly instructed agents. It therefore appears

that the words “would be marketed and sold” in the proposed implied term are not being

suggested by the pursuer to themselves form part of the contractual obligation. Rather, in

my view, this averment as to the content of the implied term must be taken to mean that the

obligation on the defender in terms of clause 3 falls to be performed within a reasonable

time. Hick v Raymond & Reid, upon which the pursuer founds, of course contemplates an

implied term as to performance of an existing obligation rather than alteration of the terms

[54] I conclude therefore, subject to the entire agreement clause, that the implied term

contended for by the pursuer, to the effect that the obligation in clause 3 is to be performed

within a reasonable time, would fall to be implied into the Agreement.

[55] It is obvious that the precise language of the entire agreement clause has to be

considered and that, for the defender’s submissions to be upheld, it requires to exclude the

implied term, or at least the basis upon which it is sought to be implied (see eg AXA Sun Life

Services Plc v Campbell Martin Ltd and others). Here, the language of the entire agreement

[56] The statement in clause 8 that “This Agreement forms the entire agreement between

the parties relating to the subject matter of this Agreement” of itself does not affect the

implied term, the whole point of the implication of the term contended for being that it

would already form part of the contract. Similarly, the reference to it being agreed that

“…any future variation hereof may only take the form of a formal variation of this

Agreement, referring in terms to this Agreement” doesn’t affect an existing implied term.

This is followed by the reference in clause 8 to it being agreed, in particular, that “…this

Agreement supersedes all earlier meetings, discussions, correspondence, facsimile

transmissions, letters and communications, understandings and arrangements of any kind

in relation to its subject matter and that there are no collateral or supplemental agreements

in relation to its subject matter at the time of the conclusion of this Agreement”. The implied

term plainly does not constitute an earlier understanding or arrangement, nor is it a

collateral or supplemental agreement, for the reason that it is intrinsic to and forms part of

[57] Accordingly, the implied term is not excluded by the terms of the entire agreement

What is the effect of the absence of specification by the pursuer of the duration of a reasonable period of

[58] As is noted above, the pursuer avers that for each month since the Agreement was

signed, the rent paid to the pursuer was less than the costs allowed to be deducted by him.

The pursuer’s position is that the Summons does not therefore proceed upon the factual

basis that the pursuer is withholding performance of the obligation to account for rent.

There are other indications in the pursuer’s pleadings which might be taken to suggest the

contrary (for example in Articles 12 and 14 of Condescendence) and he avers (in Article 6 of

Condescendence) that clause 2.2 of the Agreement did not require him to pay over the rent if

Clydesdale (and by implication the defender) did not comply with clause 3. Nonetheless,

the pursuer maintains his position that no sum was in fact being withheld.

[59] The pursuer avers that Clydesdale and the defender breached the Agreement by

failing to comply with their obligations in clause 3 within a reasonable time. It would

appear that the reliance upon this alleged breach is to support an argument that any

subsequent alleged breach by the pursuer (which as I have indicated is not accepted by the

pursuer to have occurred) was justified on the basis of mutuality. The pursuer also seeks

implement of the obligations in clause 3, again on the basis that a reasonable time has

[60] The pursuer does not aver the point in time at which Clydesdale or the defender

breached the implied term, nor does he otherwise specify the duration of a reasonable time.

His averment (in Article 8 of Condescendence) as to Clydesdale being in breach is as

follows: “By failing to take any substantive steps to implement clause 3.1 of the Sales

Agreement, Clydesdale was in breach of the Sales Agreement from 2012”. In relation to the

“Since the assignations, the Defender has taken no substantive steps to implement

the obligations imposed on Clydesdale under the Sales Agreement. The Defender

[61] By inference from these averments, the pursuer offers to prove that a reasonable time

has elapsed. He does not aver the duration of that period, but where that issue is one to be

determined by the court in light of all of the relevant circumstances, I see no requirement for

him to do so. He is effectively saying, at least in respect of the present defender, that

however long such a period might be held to have extended, it is now over. The court can

determine at proof whether that is correct. If it turns out to be the case that the sums of

money received in rent were not lawfully retained by the pursuer (for example, because the

rental maintenance costs did not exceed the rental income), the issue of precisely when the

implied term was breached may well be relevant. Again, however, that is a matter to be

determined by the court, at proof, in the whole circumstances. I do not consider that the

pursuer can be held to have failed to make out a relevant case by not averring the duration

[62] For the reasons given, I conclude that the obligation in terms of clause 3 of the

Agreement required to be performed within a reasonable time, by virtue of the existence of

[63] Accordingly I shall exclude from probation the defender’s averments to the effect

that no such term fell to be implied (in Answer 4, from “Explained and averred…” to the

end of the Answer), and I shall also repel the first and second pleas-in- law for the defender

and appoint the cause to a proof before answer on the whole remaining averments of the

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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> BURNSIDE AGAINST PROMONTORIA (CHESTNUT) LIMITED [2017] ScotCS CSOH_157 (28 December 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2017/[2017]_CSOH_157.html Cite as: [2017] CSOH 157, [2017] ScotCS CSOH_157

Scottish Court of Session Decisions